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George Santayana warned that those who forget the past are destined to 
repeat it. It was not a warning which fell on deaf ears. Historians cannot 
fail to realize the iron grip which the past holds on the present. Consensus 
about the past translates into consensus about the present. In the United 
States, disappointnlent with the post-World War I arrangements led to a 
consensus isolationism. Munich and the Holocaust delegitimized that 
isolationism both strategically and morally. It was replaced by an 
internationalist consensus that in intervening to block or contain aggress- 
ive forces such as pre-war Germany, the post-war Soviet Union and 
China, great powers such as Britain or the US were not only acting 
in their own self interest, but also in the long term interest of world 
peace. 
Containment was a liberal policy devised by a Democratic admini- 
stration. It was first challenged by the right. Republicans advocated 
replacing containment with "roll back." The Hungarian uprising 
discredited that option. It was then challenged from the left, which 
argued that the US, rather than the USSR or China, was the aggressive 
force in the world. As proof, revisionist historians cited what they 
considered the unnecessary dropping of nuclear bombs on Japan. 
Hiroshima, they argued, should take its place alongside Auschwitz as the 
twin sills which the human race should never again be permitted to 
repeat. Their case was significantly enhanced by the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the fracturing of the Comm~rnist camp, and Khrusl~chev's 
advocacy of peaceful coexistence.' 
Limited war was the liberal strategy devised to save containment by 
allaying nuclear fears. It failed dismally in Vietnam. Did that failure 
mean that limited wars were inherently impractical, immoral, or both? 
And, if so, could and should American military power ever be used 
effectively to secure American interests or ideals? From 1967 to 1991, 
the answer to these questions split the liberal camp and the Democratic 
Party between those who argued that the Vietnam debacle proved that 
limited wars were inherently both iinpractical and immoral and those 
who argued that it was an aberration which should not be used to 
discredit containment in favor of renewed isolationism. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union changed things. Since 1991, a commitment to a New 
World Order is reuniting the liberal Democratic coalition and a wariness 
of it is splitting the conservative Republicans. 
Indeed, the ebbs and flows of American electoral politics cannot be 
understood apart from this thirty-year-old debate. It began not with the 
1975 fall of Saigon but with the 1967 Egyptian closure of the Straits of 
Tiran. In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez War, Washington had pledged 
both privately and publicly to keep the Straits open. But, in 1967, 
a Democratic administration mired in Vietnam was in no position to 
keep that pledge, in part because the military insisted that it did not 
have the resources needed to act simultaneously both in Vietnam and 
the Middle East2 Moscow's strong support of Egypt was widely 
viewed as an attempt to outflank NATO from the south. James Reston 
reported: 
The vicious Middle East controversy has startled our old friends and allies in Western 
Europe. They have been saying the Cold War was over in this part of the World. . . but 
now they are not so sure. . . . and the paradox of it is that many of the Europeans who 
have been most critical of his (Johnson's) use of force in Southeast Asia are now afraid 
he might not follow this line in the Middle East.3 
1 Richard Gid Powers, ~Vot  Witlzo~lt Hoizol; The History of American Anlicoiiznz~fizisin (New Yorlr: The F1-ee 
Press), 1995, 327. 
2 Memorandum for the President, May 19; 1967 and Memoraildum for the Secretary of Defense, June 2. 
1967. JCSM-310-67; NSF. M.E. Crisis; Box 18, LBJL. 
3 New Yoi-k Times, May 31, 1967. 
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He did not and Israel was forced to go to war alone. To deflect accusa- 
tions of "sell out," Lyndon Johnson and his men argued that opponents of 
the Vietnam War (many of them Jewish) reignited isolationism in 
America and that it was this new isolationism which prevented him from 
acting. His speech writer, John Roclie, called advocates of American 
intervention in the Middle East "Doves for War." 
However, for every Martin Luther King. Jean Paul Sartre or Michael 
Harrington who was willing to make distinctions between Vietnam and 
the Middle East, there was a John Kenneth Galbraitli. a Robert Lowell 
and an Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who refused to appear inconsistent. 
Schlesinger, who in a private letter complained that being mired in 
Vietnam prevented the US from securing its more important interests in 
the Middle East, justified his refusal to call on the US to secure the 
reopening of the Straits on the ground that he could not oppose 
intervention in one country and support it in another." 
The problem of "Neoisolationism," later ltnown as the Vietnam 
syndrome, began to be hotly debated in the media. In August, 1967, 
Encounter magazine invited a cross section of intellectuals to reply to the 
following: "How, if at all, has the Israeli-Arab conflict affected your 
attitude towards war, to great-power commitments, to supporting or 
opposing just or unjust causes? How have intellectuals - and how should 
they have - reacted?" The editor, Anthony Hartly, noted: "What is 
striking about the replies . . . is not so much a change in intellectual 
attitudes towards world affairs . . . as the clash of opinions about the 
importance of holding such attitudes at all."5 
It seems that, not wishing to admit unintended consequences of 
past anti-interventionist advocacy, some intellectuals. such as Max 
Beloff, withdrew from the political battlefield. Others, like historian 
Theodore Draper, conceded that "Vietnam Doves" had to learn to 
live with the charge that they fostered a new isolationism. Draper did 
not deny the problem, but tried to avoid taking responsibility for it 
by insisting that intellectuals had little influence. It was the failure of 
4 New Yoi-lc Times, June 7 and 12 and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to Gus Tyler, June 13. 1967, Papers of Max 
Kampelman, Misc. 1967, 26E 10 IOF, Minnesota State Library. 
5 "Intellectuals &Just Canses," Eizcouiztei., Sept. 1967. 3-16 and Oct. 1967, 45-50. 
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the new interventionism and not the activity of anti-war intellectuals, 
which was responsible for the new national mood." 
Irving Kristol begged to differ: whatever the failure of America in 
Vietnam may have been, the US could not and should not resign as 
"Policeman of the World." Moreover, ideas mattered and intellectual 
support was essential to the continued ability of the American 
government to follow an internationalist line. Therefore, Kristol along 
with a group of liberal intellectuals, later linown as Neoconservatives, 
took it upon themselves to provide the American government with the 
necessary backing to counter the Vietnam Syndrome and continue to 
fight the Cold War.7 
They did not support the Vietnam War. Not until 1975 did Norman 
Podhoretz write a treatise justifying the war. In fact, they wished to see it 
ended as soon as possible. But they ref~lsed to see it as a crime 
perpetrated by evil men representative of an evil empire against a small 
virtuous Third World nation. The 1967 crisis had led them to reevaluate 
past assumptions. William Phillips, the editor of Partisan Review, wrote: 
The naked power moves of the Soviet block in the Near East, together with stale 
ideology, succeeded in bringing back the old confrontations. So. too, the almost 
automatic ganging-up on Israel of the Asian and African countries, rationalized by a 
hodge-podge of racial, national and anti-colonial propaganda, buried another hope - 
and with it the myth that being dark skinned and poor and underdeveloped made a 
nation virtuous and progres~ive.~ 
Consequently, an end to Pax Americana would not be likely to usher in an 
era of international peace and harmony, nor bring about a more just 
diffusion of power as liberals had hoped. It was more likely to usher in an 
era of violent and dangerous upheavals in the name of world revolution 
and/or a Pax Sovietica. 
That was fine with new left radicals who had little patience with 
liberals who had such "second thoughts." Alfredo Pefia wrote in the 
Militant: 
G New Yoik Times, June 12 and 15, 1967 and "Letters from Readers," Coinnzerztaiy, Dec. 1967, 14-20. 
7 Irving Ksistol, "We Can't Resign As 'Policeman of the World,"" NYT Mngnzine, 1 M n ~  12, 1968 and 
"American Inlellectnals and Foreign Policy,'' Foreign Affnii-s, July 1967; 395-409. 
8 "Symnposium: Liberal Anli-Comm~ulism Revisited," Co~iznzeiztcwy, Sept. 1967; 58. 64. 
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As those prophetic words were so well expounded by Che Guevara, that we need nlany 
Vietnams, the scene of crisis fluctuates from Southeast Asia to the Middle East. One of 
the ironies of the situation . . . is the position of suppo
r
t for Israel that many inembers 
have t a k e i ~ . ~  
The liberal split found the Black power movement including SNCC on 
the anti-Israeli - leftist- isolationist side and Jews, as a whole, on the 
internationalist side. The Jewish-black fissure, especially after the death 
of Martin Luther King, helped rend the Democratic Party and damage its 
ideological basis.1° 
The Nixon doctrine was the Republican answer to the Vietnam 
debacle. It replaced direct American intervention in the Third World with 
diplomatic and military support for regional allies such as Israel and Iran. 
But the elficacy of the policy was severely tested by the Yoin Kippur War 
and discredited by the Iranian revolution. In any case, neoconservatives 
considered detente just another name for appeasement. They bemoaned 
the American failure of nerve and blamed it on the Vietnam syndrome. "I 
think that far from having put Vietnam behind us," wrote Norman 
Podhoretz in 1977, "we are still living with it in a thousand different 
ways. It is there everywhere, a ubiquitous if often eerie invisible presence 
in our political 
For a decade isolationist McGovern liberals battled Jacksonian 
internationalist neoconservatives for control of the Democratic Party. In 
1980, when a former Roosevelt Democrat by the name of Ronald Reagan 
took control of the Republican party, the Neoconservatives not only 
helped him formulate an ideological and strategic foreign policy 
offensive designed to "liick the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all" but 
organized a movement entitled "Democrats for Reagan" to help him get 
elected.12 
Instead of concluding, as liberals had, that Vietnam proved the US 
could not and, indeed, should not, block the leftist revolutionary 
transformations of Third World countries, Reagan and his people 
9 The Milirnnt, June 26, 1967. 
10 Jonathan Kaufinan: Broken Allicmce, The Tz~rbuleizt Tiiiaes Between Blacks nizd Jews iiz Anaeiica, (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988). 80-81. 
11 Norman Podhoretz, "The Culture of Appeasement," Hnq~er's; Oct. 1977, 25. 
12 Mark Gerson, The ~Veocoiaser~~ntive Visioiz, From the Cold War to the C ~ d t ~ ~ m l  Wnrs (New York: 
Madison Books), 1996. 73-143 
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concluded that it was possible to block such transformations by adopting 
the Russian-Chinese-Vietnamese strategy. They could recruit and help 
friendly local proxies create havoc in unfriendly territories such as 
Angola, Nicaragua or Afghanistan. Washington could also buttress rather 
then help overthrow "friendly tyrants" like Pinochet or Mobutu. 
Future American ambassador to the UN, Jeanne Kirlpatriclc, even 
provided an ideological justification to these new strategies by pointing 
out that unsavory as pro-Western dictators may be, their regimes have 
never been as oppressive as the totalitarian ones seeking to replace them 
because authoritarian regimes do not have jurisdiction "over the whole of 
society." In fact, their partial jurisdiction makes them more amenable to 
reforin.13 Liberals, warning of new Vietnams bitterly opposed these 
policies and the Democratic Congress tried its best to thwart them, 
especially in Latin America. 
Republicans, led by Neoconservatives, were determined not to 
concede the moral high ground in the reheated Cold War as they had 
during the Vietnam War. They adopted the much maligned Jimmy 
Carter's post-Helsinlci human rights battle cry. By denying its citizens 
individual and group rights, the Soviet Union had demonstrated that it 
was an "evil empire." Note that the "American empire" was the 
derogatory term used by US opponents of American interventions in the 
Third World. The term "empire" also served to focus attention on 
Moscow's minorities problem.14 
Human rights, it was argued, can only be maintained in a democratic 
capitalist system which insures the diffusion of power needed to protect 
individuals and both religious and ethnic minorities from the state. A 
capitalist system which keeps economic power in private hands is a 
necessary pre-condition to liberty. Thus, the private ownership of the 
means of production acquires the moral dimension which used to belong 
to public ownersliip. 
Liberals, who by and large refused to condemn or highlight human 
rights abuses by the Soviet Union or by revolutionary regimes such as 
13 Jeanne Kirlqmtricl;, "Diclatol-ships and Double Standards." Cunznzeiztni-y, Nov. 1979, 34-45. 
14 For the best discussion of the role played by the Helsinki agreement in the collapse of the Soviet Union 
see Robert M. Gates, From tlze Shadows, The Ultimale Iizsic1ei.S Stop of Five Puesidenls m d  How Tlzey Won 
the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schaster. 1996), 85-89. 
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post-1975 Vietnam and Cambodia, stood exposed as hypocrites. 
Increasing numbers of sixties radicals from Richard Neuhaus to Barry 
Rubin to Julius Lester began to have second thoughts and many joined 
the Neoconservative Republican cadre. Thus, since the eighties, it has 
become possible to be a young, idealistic, intellectual, anti-Communist 
Rep~b l i can .~~  
The military drew its own lessons from Vietnam. The Six Day War 
discredited the gradualism which typified the Southeast Asian war. 
Hence, the military made civilian acquiescence to the application of 
overwhelming force in pursuit of precisely defined attainable goals a 
prerequisite to military intervention. That was the so called "Powell 
doctrine" so aptly detailed by Bob Woodward in his book The 
Conzrnanders. It was tested in Grenada, Panama and, most convincingly, 
in the Gulf War. As Vice President Dan Quayle told reporters, Desert 
Storm would not be "another Vietnam" because American soldiers would 
"not be asked to fight with one arm tied behind their b a ~ l t . " ~ ~  
The Gulf War also seemed to prove that in the post Cold-War, at least, 
a limited war against a Third World nation could be won not only 
militarily and ideologically but also politically by receiving UN and 
Congressional sanctions (in that order). Lyndon Johnson avoided 
vilifying the Vietnamese enemy for fear of precipitating a nuclear 
confrontation. Lacking such worries, George Bush dared compare Sadain 
Hussein to Adolf Hitler. More over, public support of Desert Storm 
discredited the idea that the American people would r e f ~ ~ s e  to fight and 
die in faraway places "merely" for economic gain, and scuttled the liberal 
myth that just as the peace movement had forced the US government to 
withdraw from Vietnam, this support would be able to prevent it from 
embarkmg on a similar venture.17 
However, when Pat Buchanan said during the pre-war debate that only 
"the Israeli Defense Ministry and its amen corner in the United States" 
supported a Gulf War, he revealed that new cracks were developing in the 
15 Their story is best told in Second Tlzought.r, Fonner Radicals Look Back At The Sixties, edited by Peter 
Collier and David Horowitz, (New Y o k  Madison Books), 1989. 
16 I V ~ V I I  Yodc Times, Jan. 24, 1991. 
17 For a conciie s~unmary of the effect of the Vietnam legacy on the Gulf War see Adam Garfinltle's 
Telltale Hearts, The Origins and Iivpnct ofthe Vietnnm Aizti>vnr Movement (\Jew York: St. Martin's Press); 
1995. 237-65. 
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Reagan coalition. As columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote, "with 
Communism defeated, Buchanan emerges, like a woolly mammoth 
frozen in the Siberian ice, as a perfectly preserved specimen of the 1930s 
isolationism and nativism." I s  
At first it seemed that George Bush meant to pick up his predecessor's 
internationalist mantle and lead a worldwide democratic crusade, To the 
delight of neoconservatives he waxed lyrical about a "New World 
Order." They were quicltly disappointed. Bush failed to evict his "Hitler" 
from Iraq, to support the pro-democracy demonstrations in China, or to 
encourage national self-determination in the former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia. Moreover, he exhibited open hostility towards Israel. 
Consequently, by 1992, inany Reagan Democrats felt just as 
uncoinfortable in the post-Cold War Republican Party as they had felt in 
the post-Vietnam Democratic one. Bill Clinton was determined to bring 
them home. He worked hard to assure them that he was heading a new 
Democratic Party which welcomed not only their support, but also their 
ideas. He invited men such as Richard Schifter, a former Democrat and 
Assistant Secretary of state for Human Rights in the Reagan administra- 
tion who had quit the Bush administration, to join his foreign policy 
team. 
His task was made easier by the fact that in the post-Soviet era, 
Neoconservative ideas were no longer anathema to the party's liberal 
wing. After all, the New World disorders offered just the type of 
challenges liberals have always advocated. If the US pursued her narrow 
self-interest in Vietnam, as liberals had argued, it had no discernible 
interest to pursue in Somalia, Liberia, Bosnia or Haiti. Indeed, Cold War 
motivated interventions were to be replaced by peacemaliing or 
peacekeeping on behalf of a UNIUS led international community. 
Thus, in public speeches and private meetings, Clinton promised 
Neoconservatives not to engage in drastic defense budget cuts, to stand 
by Israel, and to use American power to advance American interests and 
ideals. He promised to end the arms embargo against Bosnia, use air 
power to frustrate Serbia, link most favored nation trading status for 
18 Joshua M u r a v c l ~ i k ~  "Patrick J.  Bnchanan and the Jews," Coi17nzenlnrj, January 1991. 31 and 1Vnskiizgton 
Post, March 1 ,  1991. 
36 American S t ~ ~ d i e s  in Scandinavia, Vol. 29, 1997 
China to an improvement in Beijing's human rights record, restore 
democracy to Haiti, and act to end starvation in Somalia.lg These 
positions turned many Reagan Democrats into "Conservatives for 
Clinton." Joshua Muravchik of the American Enterprise Institute, wrote: 
When postwar liberal internationalism craclied under the strains of Vietnam, I made a 
simple rule for myself: I would vote for no dove for federal office. . . . Although the 
cold war is over, I remain a foreign policy voter because peace and freedom remain the 
paramount questions. To some, the importance of foreign policy stands as the strongest 
argun~ent for George BLIS~.  TO me, it settles the case for Clinton.20 
Thus, it was not just "the economy. stupid!" which won Bill Clinton the 
presidency, but the foreign policy based support of a few thousand 
opinion makers, academicians, writers and public policy entrepreneurs. 
For just as they had made voting Republican socially and politically 
respectable in the 1980, 1984 and 1988 elections, they made voting 
Democratic socially and politically respectable in 1992. Of course, to 
hold on to this specialized constituency, the new Democratic president 
had to prove that he not only knew how "to talk the talk" but also "to 
walk the walk." 
His defeated opponent put him to an early test. After a year of stead- 
fastly refusing to intervene in the New World disorders, George Bush 
changed his mind. At a Nov. 25 NSC meeting, he disregarded his own 
experts' advice and sent 28,000 American ground troops to end hunger in 
Somalia. So anxious was Bush for Security Council approval of the 
mission that he even agreed to a much greater degree of UN supervision 
of the operation than he had accepted during the Gulf War. Stunned 
participants murmured apprehensively, "another Vietnam," but Bush 
retorted that he, unlike Lyndon Johnson, would avoid a quagmire by 
taking "strong and decisive" rather than "incremental action." To counter 
accusations of political mischief, he promised to have the vast majority 
of the American troops out by inauguration day, explaining, "I don't want 
to leave an unfulfilled commitment to the next president." However, 
19 Fred Barnes. "Neocons for Clinton, They're Back!" The Nen: Repbl ic ,  August 3.  1993, 12-14, Xonnan 
Podhoretz, "The Conservative Crack-up," Conzmeiztaiy; May 1993 and Stephen John Stedman, "The Kew 
Interventionists." Foi*eign Affairs, Vol. 72; no. 1 
20 Joshna Muravchili, "Conservatives for Clinton," The A7e1v Republic, XOV. 2, 1992. 22. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Colin Powell and defense secretary Dick 
Clieney immediately countered that no "artificial deadlines" were to be 
set, and that the mission was bound to take longer than the White House 
had suggested." 
St~uined, Bill Clinton and his liberal s~~pporters had little choice but to 
"welcome" the purely altruistic intervention. Privately, they worried. Not 
only did the operation detract attention from Clinton's inauguration and 
set a new precedent for military relief operations elsewhere, but it also 
threatened to undermine Clinton's ability to keep his campaign promise 
and "focus on the economy like a laser." As an irate correspondent wrote, 
"if the incursion fails, Mr. Bush will have left Bill Clinton in a quagmire 
that will stymie his domestic efforts just as Republican cries in the 60's 
that Lyndon Johnson was soft on Communism kept him preoccupied in 
Vietnam, undercutting his Great Society programs."22 
The new president came to office determined to keep foreign policy on 
the back burner without undermining Neoconservative support. So he 
provided unparalleled backing for Israel, maintained the pressure on Iraq, 
and refrained from seriously cutting the defense budget. Aware that the 
slow humiliating disengagement from Vietnam had begun because the 
nation's foreign policy establishment, the so called Wise Men, had 
concluded that the Southeast Asian war was preventing the US from 
safeguarding its interests in more important regions such as Europe and 
the Middle East, the military had developed a two-front strategy. Those 
longing for a peace dividend hoped to see it discarded. Clinton 
disappointed them. The Pentagon's 1993 Bottom-Up Review of post- 
Cold War defense needs postulated an armed force capable of fighting 
and winning two regional conflicts sim~ltaneously.'~ 
Indeed, a New York Tinzes editorial suggesting that with the Cold War 
over the time had come to do away with the expensive strategy based on 
"the two war fantasy" drew a sharp response from Secretary of Defense 
William Perry. He insisted that having to fight two wars almost 
simultaneously will remain "entirely implausible" only as long as the US 
retains the capability to do so: "If we only have the capability for one 
21 ATew York Times, Dec. 1, 2, 4 and 7, 1992 and The A7ew Republic, Dec. 28, 1996, p. 12. 
22 A7ew Yo& Times, Dec. 9, 1992. 
23 Clark Clifford, Couilrel to the President, A Memoir, Yew York: Random House, 1991, 519 and 
Lawrence J. Korb. "Onr Over stuffed Armed Forces," Foreign A r k s ,  NovemnberIDecen~ber 1995, 24. 
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major conflict, our weakness could invite a second conflict, thereby 
malting plausible what could otherwise be an implausible scenario." 
Indubitably, Perry was describing the 1967 scenario. Thereafter, even 
experts who wished to see the American "overstuffed armed forces" 
trimmed, emphasized that such trimming could be ~mdertalten without 
undermining the two-front strategy.24 
But on October 3, 1993 Bush's time bomb finally exploded. Eighteen 
American soldiers lost their lives, and Soinalis dragged one soldier's 
body through the streets of Mogadishu. Acting instinctively, Clinton and 
his advisors, Richard Holbroolte, Peter Tarnoff and Anthony Lake (all 
aids to Henry Cabot Lodge in Vietnam), became determined not to repeat 
Lyndon Johnson's mistake. They ignored the jeers and set an early date 
for a US exit from Somalia. To their chagrin, they discovered that there 
was more to the much maligned notion of credibility than had previously 
been granted by most pundits. Within days, Haitian mobs prevented an 
American ship carrying military trainers from docking in Port-au-Prince. 
American proposals for a more aggressive NATO policy in Bosnia were 
summarily dismissed by the European allies, and the liberal media were 
just as critical of Clinton as they had been of Johnson. National Book 
Award winning author Tina Rosenberg wrote: 
Many American and European reporters began to feel that their governments were 
conspirators in a monstrous criiniilal act and that, no inatter how much they described 
the horrors they sax, nothing changed. The difference was only that Vietnam was 
immoral beca~~se  the great powers were involved, Bosnia because they weren't.25 
Disclaiming responsibility Republicans blamed the Somalia debacle on 
the UN and "mission creep," and steadfastly opposed getting involved in 
Haiti or Bosnia. In short, it seemed as if "America has passed through the 
loolung glass into an upside-down world where (some) liberal Democrats 
were calling for U.S. military action abroad while conservative Repu- 
blicans warned of swamps, sand traps, Neo-colonialism and 'another 
Vietnai~~.""~ Senator John McCain indeed claimed that Bosnia was 
bound to turn into another Vietnam, and Congressman Newt Gingrich 
24 New Y o ~ k  Times, Feb. 5 and 7 1995 and Korb. "Our Overstuffed Arined Forces," 22-34. 
25 Iizterizcrtioiznl Herald Trib~me. March 19, 1996. 
26 Roberl Kagan, "A Retreat from Power?Tonznze7zta7y, July 1995, 19-23. 
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warned that once again "the US was overextended around the world." 
Permitting internationalism to "run amok" in Somalia, lamented one 
political scientist, has revived "the isolationist 
Clinton responded by issuing the May 1994 Presidential Decision 
Directive 25 which was designed to malte US and UN peace-keeping 
more selective and more effective. The then American ambassador to the 
UN (and in 1997 new Secretary of State), Madeleine Albright, explained 
that a11 American undertaking of a military operation or agreeing to 
support a UN operation will depend on a positive answer to the 
following: Are US interests involved? Is international peace and security 
involved? Are the resources available? Is there an exit strategy?28 PDD 
25 implied that the US would no longer initiate or participate in purely 
humanitarian rescue operations. Indeed. the US acted to limit severely 
US and UN intervention in Rwanda. 
So it was Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s turn to bemoan the resurgence of the 
Neo-isolationist impulse in the US. He called PDD 25 "ill-judged," 
though he conceded that "dying for world order when there is no concrete 
threat to one's own nation is a hard arguinent to malte." That is the reason 
that Congress and the public refuse to sacrifice for that order their 
professional army despite the fact that it is "made up of men and women 
who volunteered for the job; and the job, alas, may include fighting, 
killing and dying."2g The culprit, bemoaned another pundit is "the 
demographic character of modern, postind~~strial societies" which causes 
parents of professional soldiers to view their child's "wounding or death 
as an outrageous scandal rather than an occupational hazard."'O 
Be that as it may, by the 1994 midterm election there was a general 
consensus that in foreign policy Clinton like Carter was not ready "to 
walk the walk." But unlike Carter, not only did he have two years to 
mend his way but the Republicans failed to take advantage of Clinton's 
meandering by picking up the internationalist banner. Instead their 
presidential candidates "were acting as if the world did not exist." 
27 David C. Hendriclcson, "The Recovery of Internationnlism," Fo~eigrz Afnirs, SeptiOct., 1994, p. 26. 
28 Madeleine K. Albrighl. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Opera- 
tions," U.S. Dqmmzent  of State Dispatch, May 16, 1994, 315. 
29 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Back to h e  Womb?" Fo7-eigiz Affaii-s. JulyIA~~gnst, 1995. 6-7. 
30 Edward N. Luttxvalc, "Is Illterveiltion AThing of the Past;" Hal-i,er's, Oct. 1994. 15-17. 
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Without "a foreign policy component," New York Times columnist Tom 
Friedman observed, Republicanism had lost the "sense of largess" it had 
possessed during the Cold Was.31 
But before Clinton could coopt that sense of largess, he had to develop 
the "Clinton doctrine," a low-risk strategy designed to avoid the pitfalls 
of Vietnam and Somalia. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake 
explains: "You do not merely have an exit strategy, you actually set a 
deadline when you go in that says you x e  not there to let the local 
political forces evade responsibility, become dependent or r e s e n t f ~ l . " ~ ~  
The new strategy was tested in Haiti. It seemed to work. 
But the big Democratic-Republican (Clinton-Dole) battle raged 
around Bosnia, and it contained unmistakable echoes of the past. Dole 
called on Clinton to arm the Bosnians in order "to demonstrate American 
commitment to support the right of self-defense against aggression," i.e., 
to apply the Nixon doctrine. "The Bosnians are not asking for U.S. 
troops," Dole asserted, "only for arms to defend their families, their 
homes and their country."33 
Clinton retorted that Dole's strategy would not only alienate allies who 
opposed such an action but also "Americanize" the war because with 
weapons would come "advisors" and so on, a la Vietnam. Moreover, the 
intensified fighting might lead to a "wider conflict in the Balltans, with 
far-reaching implications for Europe and the world" (an updated domino 
theory). Instead, Clinton wanted to use air power as "NATO air power 
will not end the fighting in Bosnia, it can deter aggression or at least 
increase its price and in the process, it will enhance the chances of a 
diplomatic ~et t le inent ."~~ 
Robert McNamara could not have said it better. It was a small wonder 
that fear of Vietnam redux caused the former defense secretary to 
overcome his past reluctance to participate in the post-Vietnam debate 
and publish In Retrospect. The hostile reception he received was at least 
in part due to his opposition to intervention in Bosnia which former 
doves supported. 
'5: 
31 New York Times: Feb. 10 a~ ld  12, 1996. 
32 The Iizterizntio~znl Hemld T~iDuize, Feb. 1 ,  1996. 
33 "Let Bosnia Control its Own Fi~ture," by Senator Bob Dole: Newsweel:; Kov. 15: 1995, 25 
34 "The Risk of Americanizing the War," by President Clinton, hrewsweek, Nov. 15, 1995, 24. 
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Clinton stuck to his guns, though he tried to relieve interventionist 
pressure by indirectly strengthening the Bosnian M u s l i ~ n s . ~ ~  Only when 
the Bosnian Serb defiance puslied NATO to the verge of collapse did the 
administration step in and force tlie parties to make the concessions 
necessary to permit a Haitian-like operation. Not an American interven- 
tion, the President insisted, but a single year international commitment. to 
"give peace a chalice." And it was liberal Strobe Talbott's turn to argue, a 
la Kristol, that "if the US does not lead, no one will lead."36 To secure 
Bob Dole's if not Pat Buchanan's support, Clinton promised to 
strengthen the Bosnian Muslim army though lie distanced his adniinistra- 
tion from the operation by privatizing the training and getting Turkey to 
supply the weaponry. A cartoonist noted that the retired US military 
officers hired to train the Muslims were veterans of Cold War battles 
including V i e t n a ~ n . ~ ~  
When queried about the problem of isolationism in America, Clinton 
magnanimously replied that both parties are divided between isolatio- 
nists and internationalists. Actually, the reunited internationalist center 
seems to be holding. Thus, when coluinnist Jim Hoagland reminded his 
readers of the McGovernite slogan "Come Home America," a letter to the 
editor accused him of misconstruing the meaning of the slogan. "Far 
from being a literal demand to withdraw from the world. it was a call for 
America to turn away from particular policies in Vietnam, Chile and 
Greece, which were regarded as evil . . . . Many of us who opposed those 
policies were internationalist in outlook then and remain so today, 
supporting the current US efforts in B o ~ n i a . " ~ ~  Similarly, a Newsweek 
article in which a US colonel complained about the climactic coiiditions 
drew a barrage of letters deriding media editorializing, militasy 
bellyaching (soldiers are well-paid volunteers doing their job), and 
immoral willingiiess of opponents to countenance another H o l o c a ~ s t . ~ ~  
This support helped Clinton to overcome the handicap of his past. As 
35 The US stopped enforcing Lhe UN arms embargo, agreed to Irail~ail a r m  sales to Bosnian Muslim and 
encouraged MuslimCroat cooperation. "A Call to Open Arms," Newsweek; June 3, 1966, 10-12. 
36 U.S. Department of Stale Dispatch. Ocl. 31, 1995. 8. 
37 "Generals for Hire," Time, Jan. 15, 1966 and IHT, Jan. 25, 1966. 
38 IHT, Jniz. 8, mad 31, 1966. 
39 Nevvsvveelc, Dec. 18, 1995 and Jan. 22, 1996. 
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could have been expected, when Clinton granted "Sixty Minutes" an 
interview to explain his sending of American troops to Bosnia, Leslie 
Stahl asked the dreaded question: How can you, who avoided military 
service, sent soldiers to die? His answer heralded the final transformation 
of young Bill Clinton: "Because I am the Comr~zarzder in Chief and it is 
my prerogative under the American constitution." Bill Clinton turned 
foreign policy into an electoral positive, and emerged as a leader. After 
all, polls taken from October 1993, a week after the killing of 18 
American soldiers in Somalia, through April 1995 showed that the 
majority of Americans even supported contributing US troops to UN 
peace keeping missions. Americans, as tlie Economist (which printed 
Clinton's p ic t~~re  alongside those of Lincoln, Churcliill and Patton) points 
out, in addition to being the only ones with the clout to lead, are also the 
only ones eager to do so.40 
True, but they would rather not have to lead Europe so much. When 
the US military imagines a two-front war, it has the Gulf and Korea, West 
Asia and East Asia, in mind. After all, the q~~est ion f the containment of 
China has resurfaced, and it was the need to contain China, no less than 
the wish to make money, that was the root cause of the American decision 
to establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Richard Holbroolte, the 
architect of the Dayton agreement, did not mince words: 
We all understand that the U S .  role was the decisive factor in the (Bosnia) 
breakthrough. . . . Europeans have to ask themselves why it is that America remains as 
important as it was in the Cold War era to the solutions of problems on the European 
mainland. This is not true of Asia. America is a Pacific power with vast economic and 
strategic interest there, but we are no longer essential to political balance in Asia as we 
were during the Korean and Vietnam wars. In Europe we still are. This is one of the 
great coilundruins of the post-Cold War world.41 
Holbrooke may be too optimistic about Asia. In any case, it seems as if 
the Atlanticist - Pacificist debate which undergirded the foreign policy 
establishments's disagreements during the Vietnam War has resurfaced. 
Nor has the American solution for Bosnia escaped the much criticized US 
tendency to try to remake the world in its own image. For as Strobe 
40 IHT, May 15, 1966 and The Ecoizoiizist. Dec. 9 ,  1995. 53. 
41 IHT, Jan 31. 1996. 
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Talbott explained, the US is no longer satisfied with malting the world 
safe for democracy, but is also determined to make it safe for 
multicultural states. "The US is a m~~lticultural country," Talbott averred, 
"and it is interested in the well-being of other inulticultural 
Hence, the insistence on a multicultural solution for Bosnia in the form of 
a Bosnian-Croat federation which neither participant much wants and 
few believe will last. 
Of course, without an ideological component, the "Clinton doctrine" is 
just another term for gunboat diplomacy. The problem is that malting the 
world safe for democracy, and lor multiculturalism, demands a thorough 
overhaul of the judicial and the executive systems of other ountries, i.e., 
the much dreaded Vietnam era nation building. Indeed, since the signing 
of the Dayton agreement, much of the liberal criticism of American 
policy in Bosnia focused on NATO reluctance to engage in what critics 
label, "social work" i.e. securing a free press, guaranteeing the right to 
travel and capturing war criminak4' 
Nor has the Janus-faced European response to American intervention 
been altered. In 1966, on his way to examine the battlefields of Vietnam, 
Moshe Dayan sought out French expert advice; he discovered that their 
condemnation of that war did not mean that the French seriously wished 
the US to leave Vietnam. It only meant that, secure in the knowledge that 
the US would stay the course, they felt free to benefit from criticizing it.44 
Similarly, before the US placed gro~md troops in Bosnia, Europeans 
complained about American isolationism and Pacificism. Once US 
troops joined the allies in Bosnia, the French press became enamored by 
the theory that Washington was intent on building a new "empire" from 
Muslim Bosnia to the Gulf in order to secure access to Mideast oil and to 
counter Moslem fundamentalism. Well, there are internationalists in the 
US, especially in the business circles (the villainous military-industrial 
complex?), retorts Los Angeles syndicated columnist William Pfaff but 
their influence is countered by "the force of popular opinion, which since 
Vietnam has largely been turned inward."45 
42 IHT, Oct. 31. 1995. 
43 Michael Mandelba~un; "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Afairs, Jan./Feb. 1966 16-32. 
44 Moshe Dayan, Yoman Vielizanz (Vietnam Diary), Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1979. 24. 
45 IHZ Feb. 26. 1996. 
44 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 29, 1997 
So, here we go again. It seems that Santayana was right, those who do 
not learn from the past, are destined to relive it. But to Bob Dole's 
frustration, Bill Clinton is not one of them. After a shaky start, he has 
succeeded in inalting a moderately interventionist policy an electoral 
positive. Bob Dole did his best. The World War I1 veteran fumed at the 
Vietnam War protester, called him and his advisors, "a corps of the elite 
who never grew up, never did anything real, never sacrificed and never 
learned," and "would-be statesmen still suffering froin a post-Vietnam 
syndroine." But the accusations lacked bite. In fact, Clinton's successful 
foreign sojourns made it possible for the Democratic party to return to 
Chicago, reclaim the mainstream image thcy had lost in 1968, and win 
decisively in 1996.46 
46 IHT. M a y  15, 1996 and NYT, July 7,411g. 16 and 25, 1996. 
